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Introduction
The life-supporting capacity of New Zealand’s environments 
has been much reduced and the pace of degradation shows 
little sign of abating (Ministry for the Environment and 
Statistics New Zealand, 2015). Few countries are experiencing 
greater biodiversity loss, more rapid freshwater deterioration 
or greater per capita increases in greenhouse gas emissions 
(Myers et al., 2013; Parliamentary Commissioner for 
the Environment, 2016; Gluckman, 2017). The climate 
is changing fast and it is already clear that a number of 
communities cannot be sustained for more than another 
decade or two in their current locations (Parliamentary 
Commissioner for the Environment, 2017). 
The degradation of fresh water and loss 
of freshwater ecosystems is currently the 
most observable, culturally offensive and 
publicised environmental issue. Pathogens 
in drinking water are causing serious 
illness in increasing numbers of people, 
and it is only a matter of time before the 
availability of fresh water and its pollution 
constrain the national economy (OECD, 
2017). However, freshwater management 
is only one of a range of environmental 
problems that diminish our quality of life 
and threaten our well-being. 
The politics of environmental man-
agement have been brought into focus 
over the current election cycle, but 
environmental connections with social 
and economic management have yet to 
capture public attention. Economic and 
social issues such as New Zealand’s 
dependence on commodity exports, 
weaknesses in the tax system, high levels 
of private debt, wealth inequality, land 
price inflation and the housing crisis are 
typically debated separately and without 
recognition of the potential for 
environmental policies to contribute to 
their resolution. Given the plethora of 
competing and serious issues, the 
electorate may be looking for more than 
vague assurance and marginal improve-
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ment this year. Here, we suggest that 
principled integration of novel policies 
and institutions across environmental, 
economic and social realms is necessary to 
make the best of opportunities and 
minimise the pain and suffering of 
restructuring. 
The policy debate
The fundamental issue for New Zealand is 
that social, environmental and economic 
sustainability is simply not possible under 
current policy settings, and therefore a 
wide-ranging and potentially painful 
restructuring is inevitable. Winning 
sufficient and timely public support 
for reform is one problem; another 
is how reform should be designed to 
make restructuring as orderly and fair as 
possible. 
Central to environmental policy 
debates is whether it is reasonable for the 
public to impose constraints on private 
economic opportunity reliant on 
consumption of public environmental 
goods. Those debates unfold quite 
predictably, because many of those in 
power depend on support from private 
interests who are concerned with 
protecting their right to extract from 
nature at minimal cost. The interest of the 
general public in maintaining 
environmental quality is typically diffuse 
and politically weaker. Consequently, 
policy debate is usually dominated by 
private concerns about additional costs 
and loss of commercial returns. Although 
many rally to defend environmental 
values that are less easily expressed in 
dollars, there is little political motivation 
to properly address their concerns, and 
few actions are undertaken that result in 
improved environmental outcomes. 
The framing of policies depends on 
beliefs about the fundamental drivers of 
environmental degradation. A popular 
narrative is that the main causes of 
degradation are lack of knowledge about 
natural values, overestimation of nature’s 
assimilative capacity, and ignorance about 
less damaging ways to do things. From 
this belief, it follows that appropriate and 
reasonable policies provide information, 
education and awards, with regulation 
and sanction only as a last resort. An 
alternative narrative is that harming the 
environment is a crime that should simply 
be strictly regulated and penalised. We 
think it is abundantly clear that neither 
approach alone is tenable in New Zealand: 
the first is clearly insufficient to halt 
ongoing environmental degradation, and 
the second politically unsustainable.
A technocratic narrative and belief – 
the one we represent here – is that 
environmental degradation results from 
the unequal power of public and private 
vested interests. The benefits of 
environmentally degrading activities are 
usually attained rapidly and are 
concentrated in the hands of comparatively 
powerful, motivated and organised 
private interests whose rational interest is 
to maximise private benefit. The 
environmental costs of their activities are 
longer term, cumulative and dispersed. 
Costs are largely borne by members of the 
wider public (including future genera-
tions), who, though numerous, are 
comparatively disorganised and distract-
ed, with more limited access to power. 
This allows the overall costs of 
environmental degradation to substan-
tially exceed the value of benefits extracted. 
Unfortunately, the only way out of this 
entrenched pattern is for those who 
represent public interests in the 
environment to organise and mobilise 
more effectively to win a mandate for the 
external costs of development and 
production to be absorbed by those who 
reap most benefit. This requires political 
activism. But having gained that mandate, 
meaningful change will require cohesion 
and clarity in the solutions proposed. 
There are signs of this emerging, for 
example in the recent proposal put 
forward by a consortium of academics, 
NGOs, industry representatives and 
others (the ‘freshwater rescue plan’, 
available at https://www.freshwaterrescue 
plan.org/). As a contribution to that trend, 
in this article we discuss two approaches 
that could potentially be taken to solving 
New Zealand’s environmental problems – 
one essentially regulatory, and the other 
essentially economic. Both, of course, rely 
on sufficient mandate for reform.
Solving the problem 
New Zealand could add a suite of clearly 
defined bottom lines to its present 
regulatory approach to addressing 
environmental harm. The aim would be 
to issue consents and allow for permitted 
activities only within a carefully defined 
system of biophysical bottom lines for all 
aspects of concern (nitrogen, phosphorus, 
sediment, pathogens, abstractions, 
discharges, run-off, greenhouse gas 
emissions, habitat protection, landscapes, 
threatened species and biodiversity, 
etc.). In this approach, bottom lines are 
negotiated via planning processes and 
implemented via consenting processes, 
and compliance with conditions and 
limits is strictly enforced. In this scenario, 
regulatory plans and consents constrained 
by bottom lines form the system of defence 
against social and economic drivers of 
environmental degradation. This puts 
environmental regulation in competition 
with social and economic goals, leading to 
a focus on trade-offs instead of the wider 
benefits potentially available with policy 
integration. 
An alternative approach, usually framed 
as ‘polluter pays’, is essentially economic. 
The integrated economic approach 
uses a suite of taxes and trading 
schemes to promote efficient use of 
the natural environment by recovering 
environmental costs, restraining 
environmental consumption ... 
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The integrated economic approach uses a 
suite of taxes and trading schemes to 
promote efficient use of the natural 
environment by recovering environmental 
costs, restraining environmental 
consumption and, most importantly, 
contributing to the resolution of social 
and economic problems. This approach is 
underpinned by plans based on 
environmental goals, the regulatory 
biophysical bottom lines to achieve those 
goals, and systems to administer the 
purchase of resource allocations. We posit 
that bottom lines act as cap parameters 
for the resource trading schemes and that 
resource consents create the right to 
purchase a portion of that resource cap.
Economic approaches along these 
lines have been proposed and some are 
active in particular areas (for example, 
Lake Taupö nitrogen trading). While such 
piecemeal economic approaches (such as 
regional-scale water, nitrogen and carbon 
trading) could support achievement of 
some bottom lines, they are unlikely to 
contribute much to resolution of wider 
environmental, social and economic 
issues. The real value of an integrated 
economic approach lies in environmental 
policy tools being specifically designed to 
help resolve issues in other policy realms. 
This is the essential difference that 
distinguishes the integrated economic 
approach from the regulatory bottom 
lines approach.
Our conception of the integrated 
economic approach is founded on the 
following ideas:
•	 the	tax	system	should	tax	all	forms	of	
benefit equally in order to be fair and 
minimise harmful economic 
distortion; 
•	 a	fair	polluter-pays	approach	would	
touch every individual because every 
person has an environmental 
footprint from which private benefits 
are obtained.
Many private benefits gained from 
land ownership and environmental 
footprints fall outside our current tax 
system. This creates investment bias 
towards property ownership and 
environmental degradation. This 
investment bias has driven growing 
concentration of wealth among property 
owners and contributed to current social 
and economic issues, including:
•	 housing	affordability	due	to	property	
price inflation relative to income 
growth;
•	 lack	of	affordable	housing	due	to	
tax-driven bias towards investment in 
large properties and deep 
environmental footprints;
•	 investment	bias	towards	commodity	
production businesses with large 
environmental footprints relative to 
small-footprint, value-adding 
enterprises;
•	 high	levels	of	foreign-owned	private	
property debt now posing a risk to 
financial stability.
A comprehensive system of land and 
environmental taxes is necessary to 
correct the social and economic damage 
resulting from its absence. Implementation 
of such a system presents opportunities to 
raise productivity and well-being by 
shifting the tax base away from social 
goods such as employment, enterprise 
and trade and on to social bads such as 
environmental degradation, harmful 
products and high-risk activities.
We envisage an integrated economic 
approach comprising a tax on everyone’s 
environmental footprint, supplemented 
by resource-specific cap-and-trade 
schemes to address environmental issues 
insufficiently addressed by the footprint 
tax. The footprint tax is a land tax levied 
annually on all landowners according to 
property area and footprint depth 
estimated from the level of environmental 
degradation discernible from satellite 
imagery. This form of tax was first 
proposed during property tax reform 
discussions in Germany (Bizer and Lang, 
2000, cited in Brandt, 2014) and has been 
further developed for the New Zealand 
context by Stephens et al. (2016). In 
essence, the footprint tax is an annual 
payment to the public purse for private 
benefits now gained from past 
consumption of public environmental 
goods. The tax creates incentives for 
maintenance and restoration of 
biodiversity and ecosystem services. It is a 
form of economic instrument suitable for 
maintaining aspects of the environment 
that cannot be addressed by resource 
trading schemes. Biodiversity and 
landscape quality are important aspects of 
the environment that defy quantification 
by simple units of measurement needed 
for resource trading schemes to operate. 
We assume that revenue from 
environmental taxes will be partly recycled 
via cuts to other taxes such as income, 
company and GST.
The footprint tax cannot provide 
certainty about environmental outcomes 
because specified bottom lines are not a 
part of its design. Furthermore, evidence 
from satellite imagery is a poor proxy for 
some critically important aspects of 
environmental consumption (e.g. water 
takes, nitrogen loading and greenhouse 
gas emissions) that are unlikely to be 
sufficiently reduced by the footprint tax. 
Therefore, resource cap-and-trade 
schemes will be needed to create the 
additional incentives necessary to achieve 
desired outcomes. These schemes depend 
on the existence of negotiated regulatory 
bottom lines to create a ‘cap’ for the 
trading system. The cap provides certainty 
about the overall quantum of emissions 
allowed and must be easily defined in 
commodity units, such as litres of water, 
E. coli cells per litre, kilograms of nitrogen 
and tonnes of CO2 equivalents, in order to 
be able to be divided fairly. The trade of 
individual allocations promotes efficient 
resource use and provides flexibility for 
The footprint tax cannot provide certainty 
about environmental outcomes because 
specified bottom lines are not a part of 
its design.
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businesses to respond to increased 
environmental costs in whatever ways best 
suit their particular circumstances. In 
addition, resource-specific taxes, also 
termed royalties, may also be applied as 
recompense for the private consumption 
of publicly owned resources and to cover 
administrative costs. These taxes can be 
stand-alone systems (e.g. royalties on 
mined minerals) or built into trading 
schemes as a charge per unit. The charge 
may be fixed or determined by auction. 
The distributional characteristics of 
both the footprint tax and resource 
trading schemes are highly progressive. 
Land area owned and footprint depth (i.e. 
environmental resources consumed) are 
strongly correlated with wealth. However, 
if that wealth is largely debt funded, then 
the footprint tax and/or the cost of 
obtaining resource allocations will be 
problematic for its owner. Clearly a 
generous transition period will be 
important to provide time for financial 
restructuring, but other solutions may 
also be appropriate. One is to distribute 
footprint tax liability according to owner 
equity so that the owner is liable only for 
the portion of the business or property 
owned and the lender is liable for the 
debt-funded remainder. This would give 
financiers some much-needed incentive 
to consider the environmental costs of the 
enterprises they lend to. The other 
solution is to defer payment, potentially 
until the land is sold. 
We anticipate that the corrective 
contribution of environmental taxes to 
social and economic goals should confer 
acceptability and resilience unattainable 
with environmental policy that is 
independent of, or in competition with, 
other goals. Furthermore, opposition to 
environmental reforms may be assuaged 
by accompanied lowering of income and 
company tax rates, plus the marketing 
opportunities provided by known and 
diminishing environmental footprints.
Costs and benefits of the two approaches
On their own, regulatory bottom lines are 
minimum standards that in theory should 
protect the public interest in nature 
from the damaging activities of humans. 
They have several key ingredients: limits 
that stakeholders can abide (so they 
actually make it into policy); a regulated 
community to adhere to them; and an 
agency to take action when they do not. 
The benefits of regulatory bottom lines 
include:
•	 clear	thresholds	that	are	publicly	
known;
•	 an	indication	of	agency	commitment	
to addressing a given issue;
•	 some	assurance	that	minimum	
protections are in place over which 
extraction and use of resources is 
allowed; and
•	 simplicity,	in	that	there	is	little	need	
for engagement and integration with 
other policy realms. 
However, costs and uncertainties of 
regulatory bottom lines can be significant. 
They include:
•	 Planning	processes	may	be	expensive	
and cumbersome as environment–
economy trade-offs are contested in 
the absence of accompanying 
economic institutions.
•	 Pollution	rights	are	allocated	on	a	first	
come, first served basis and there is no 
mechanism to transfer these rights to 
the most efficient resource users. This 
is a constraint on economic 
productivity.
•	 Outcomes	are	uncertain,	because	
parties whose activities may cause 
environmental damage are likely to 
contest the parameters of bottom 
lines or to render them too high to 
drive sustainable behaviour.
•	 Parameters	may	not	be	technically	
straightforward to set: they will of 
necessity be numerous, and will need 
to differ among locations and may 
require frequent adjustment.
•	 Weak	incentives	to	adhere	to	
regulatory limits place significant 
reliance on consent monitoring and 
enforcement to bring about 
behaviour change. This may be 
expensive, costs may be difficult to 
recover from environmental 
consumers and poor outcomes are 
likely (Brown, 2017). 
•	 Bottom	lines	are	also	likely	to	conflict	
with existing social and economic 
objectives and can thus be subject to 
long-running and litigious argument.
The benefits of the integrated 
economic approach include:
•	 contributions	to	amelioration	of	
systemic social and economic 
sustainability issues;
•	 increased	supply	of	ecosystem	services	
and reduced area of land unable to 
supply basic ecosystem services;
•	 better	care	and	maintenance	of	
natural areas on private land;
•	 outcome	certainty	created	by	bottom	
lines required for cap-and-trade 
schemes; and
•	 improved	economic	productivity	as	
resource use rights transfer to the 
most economically efficient users.
The costs of implementing such 
ambitious reform are substantial and 
include:
•	 design,	including	understanding	the	
effects on environmental and 
investment behaviour sufficiently to 
achieve desired social, economic and 
environmental goals and avoid or 
remedy potentially perverse 
outcomes;
•	 that	vested	interests	may	be	able	to	
influence the design of economic 
instruments to the extent that the 
desired incentives and revenues are 
unachievable (Leining and Kerr, 
2016);
Environmental management seems 
certain to be an important election issue, 
both in 2017 and over the coming 
decades.
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•	 setting	up	the	institutional	and	
administrative arrangements to 
implement novel systems for which 
extant public agencies are probably 
not well equipped (which will include 
disestablishing agency functions 
made redundant by these systems);
•	 potential	failure	of	businesses	that	
cannot afford to pay environmental 
costs (because their present model 
relies on common resources provided 
at no charge).
Proposed or recommended course of action 
Environmental management seems 
certain to be an important election 
issue, both in 2017 and over the coming 
decades. Few days go by without concerns 
about freshwater degradation, climate 
change or biodiversity loss being expressed 
in the mainstream media. Recent attempts 
to introduce and lift New Zealand’s 
environmental bottom lines and tighten 
regulation for fresh water have not yet 
been successfully implemented in the 
face of conflicting economic policies and 
without adequate economic incentives. 
To address its environmental problems, 
New Zealand clearly needs major policy 
reform, not the legal and policy fiddling 
witnessed to date. 
If environmental policy is to be aligned 
with social, fiscal and economic policies, 
or at least not in conflict with them, then 
economic instruments to incentivise 
efficient use of the environment and give 
private interests plenty of choice about 
how to manage individual liabilities may 
be more politically viable than 
conventional approaches relying on 
regulated bottom lines alone. Gradually 
rising bottom lines and tighter regulation 
are more feasible if the components of 
our environmental and economic systems 
do not work against each other as they do 
at present. We propose an integrated 
national suite of economic instruments 
based on the polluter-pays principle to 
address environmental problems and 
many systemic economic and social 
sustainability issues as well. It has three 
major components: 
•	 a	tax	on	everyone’s	environmental	
footprint akin to that proposed by 
Stephens et al. (2016): a form of land 
tax on every landowner’s 
environmental footprint, with inbuilt 
economic incentives for best-practice 
land use, sustainable management of 
natural values, including permanent 
forest sinks, covenanting of significant 
habitat and other restoration 
initiatives;
•	 cap-and-trade	systems	for	greenhouse	
gases, nitrogen and water take. 
Regulated bottom line caps, set at a 
national level for greenhouse gases 
and at local catchment scale for 
nitrogen and water but subject to 
overarching national cap-setting rules 
to protect wider public interests, must 
underpin each system. For example, 
people downstream need their 
interests protected from the excesses 
of those upstream. The right to use a 
resource (the consent) should be 
distinct from the amount of resource 
that can be used (the individual’s 
allocation). This should be purchased 
by auction to encourage the transfer 
of allocation to the most efficient 
users. Caps should be sufficiently 
restrictive to ensure that prices paid 
provide net revenue after 
administrative costs;
•	 robust	monitoring	and	reporting	on	
outcomes to enable the success of 
different approaches to be evident to 
the public and for scheme 
adjustments to be made in order to 
improve effectiveness and fairness.
The overall system should be designed 
to generate substantial revenue. Public 
support for implementation is likely to be 
stronger if revenue is used to lower taxes 
on social goods such as employment and 
trade and to fund social and economic 
objectives. Its success could be enhanced 
by ending environmentally degrading 
funding (such as that for mass irrigation 
in dryland environments, and for fossil 
fuel exploration and production). Some 
revenue should be returned to Mäori in 
recognition of Treaty of Waitangi rights, 
and some used to help turn around 
centuries of freshwater and wetland 
degradation.
In the background there will need to 
be a concerted effort to limit the influence 
of vested interests in environmental 
governance. Much environmental 
degradation has been enabled and 
promoted by political and agency capture 
(Office of the Auditor-General, 2011; 
Clare and Krogman, 2013; Brown et al., 
2015; Brown, 2017). The auditor-general 
has recognised this and plans to examine 
several aspects of the problem in 2017–18. 
It is also the subject of action 7 in the 
recently released freshwater rescue plan 
mentioned above. Policy solutions are 
needed that motivate politicians and 
agency managers to resist pressure from 
vested interests and promulgate effective 
policy solutions that protect the public 
interest in social, environmental and 
economic sustainability. 
Owners of highly leveraged businesses 
involving intensive land uses would be 
most affected by our policy prescription. 
Liability would be large relative to profit 
(made small by debt-servicing costs) and 
any company tax cut would be likely to be 
small relative to environmental payments. 
In contrast, people with little property on 
low incomes are likely to be very much 
better off. Members of this group typically 
have small environmental footprints and 
Policy solutions are needed that motivate 
politicians and agency managers to  
resist pressure from vested interests  
and promulgate effective policy solutions 
that protect the public interest in 
social, environmental and economic 
sustainability.
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would be beneficiaries of any 
accompanying income tax cuts. Their 
environmental costs would lie in what 
may be passed on in rents and in the 
higher cost of consumer products with 
large environmental inputs. The ultimate 
winners could be those living in apartment 
buildings. Although the footprint of an 
apartment block is deep, it is small in area 
and shared by many people. Ordinary 
suburban home owners with land of only 
a few hundred square metres would feel 
more impact, but some may nevertheless 
be better off following cuts in other taxes.
In summary
Environmental degradation is more 
and more evident to the voting public. 
A new government in 2017 will take 
power at an important crossroads for the 
sustainability of New Zealand’s social, 
economic and natural systems. Progress 
towards sustainability will require rather 
more ambitious proposals than have 
been implemented in recent years. The 
best chance of success will come from 
robust regulatory changes, backed with 
effective and responsive policy solutions 
that integrate environmental objectives 
into the economic and social policy 
context. These initiatives will be most 
likely to occur in a context that dilutes 
the influence of extractive interests and 
better provides for the interests of future 
generations.
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